Αυτή είναι η τελευταία μου εργασία για το πρώτο έτος του μεταπτυχιακού. Οι επόμενες θα αρχίσουν από τον Οκτώβριο. Φυσικά είναι πνευματική μου ιδιοκτησία και δεν επιτρέπω την αντιγραφή. Αν χρησιμοποιηθεί κάτι παρακαλώ να αναφερθεί η πηγή.
ABSTRACT: In order to answer the question of a feasible
NATO enlargement in the Black Sea Region we have to take into consideration various
factors: The willingness of NATO to advance in the region, the impact of the
enlargement to Russia, the position of Russia in this enlargement and the
attitude of the states of the region towards NATO. In this paper we will show
that although an enlargement would be feasible in the future there are certain
obstacles that impede this advancement. The paper is based in written sources.
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As it is explained in the
official NATO brochure What is NATO there
is an Open Door policy. This became obvious from the very beginning of the
founding of the Alliance as very soon NATO extended the membership to involve
Greece and Turkey and West Germany. Spain became a member in 1982. After the
end of the Cold War another enlargement took place. Central European countries
solicited NATO membership as they believed that their security interests were satisfied
by joining NATO. So in 1999 the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland became members
raising the number of member countries to 19. Seven more countries became
members of the Alliance at the end of March 2004: Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania,
Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia. This was the most extensive enlargement in the
history of the Alliance. In April 2009 Albania and Croatia became members.
Every European democracy is welcomed to seek membership under the
presupposition that it agrees to comply with the responsibilities and
obligations that derive from the membership. The reason why NATO holds its door
open is to develop security as well as collaboration that would build peace
established on democratic morals. [1]
On the other hand the governments
of the states that constitute NATO are clear on their perspectives. Enlargement
of the Alliance is not an end in itself; it is rather a tool to widen security
to include distant places, thus making Europe a more stable region. In the Alliance they hold that the candidacy
of a certain state would be a motivating influence for disagreements and
conflicts between neighboring countries to be resolved. Countries that want to
become new members of NATO have also to undergo reforms and democratization and
apart from benefiting in terms of security they have to also provide security
to other members.
NATO is facing today difficult
choices regarding the democratic transformation and security in the Black Sea
region. States that wish to be fellow members are investigated as to whether
their qualifications are connected and adequate to NATO. As it is easily
understood Russia comes on the scene as a decisive component in this
discussion. This means that any thought about NATO enlargement would
potentially irritate Russia. We have to bear in mind that today’s Russia is
stronger and more self-confident. Its influence in particular in the economic
field is greater in the Black Sea region. Another contributing factor is that
there is a controversy in the very confines of NATO about the “identity” of the
Black Sea region countries. For example can we consider Georgia and Ukraine as
European countries? And what we can say about Moldova, Armenia and Azerbaijan?
The later countries although have not immediate access to the Black Sea they
are considered part of the region.[2]
Another question that arises is
if NATO has the aptitude to deal with the future security situations of the
current century since for example in Afghanistan, the current NATO’s main
priority, Taliban continue to fight without any consequence. Furthermore central
and local governments are corrupted thus making the Afghans turn to extremists,
something that raises fears of civil war after the withdrawal of NATO forces.[3]
NATO
policy in the Wider Black Sea Region
Although till the previous decade
the wider Black Sea region was a region of the periphery concerning the
Westerns, now has become the next frontier in NATO’s strategy. In the light of
the increasing energy prices, a more confident Russia and the instability in
the wider area of Middle East, the strategy makers moved their attention
towards the Black Sea region as a whole. So from a periphery Black Sea became a
central strategic area and an important crossroad. Its strategic significance
is a perspective as well as a challenge in the same time. Since there are
various disputes in the region they have to be adjudicated in a peaceful way.
The various states in the region have to be governed in the rule of law and
they have to fight against corruption and trafficking. Another prerequisite is
the security of the energy production and transportation and more healthy and
well-healed markets. If all these goals can be achieved the region would play
the role of a bridge between East and West. If they fail to cope with their
problems there is the risk of destabilization of the whole area with
consequences reaching up into Europe, Eurasia and the Middle East.[4] Russia currently resolutely impedes former Soviet states from
joining NATO. It has military service in some of these countries and the Black
Sea Fleet will stay in Ukraine until 2017. So to judge if a NATO enlargement in
the area is feasible we have to consider the forces that characterize the wider
Black Sea area.[5]
When on February 25, 1991 the
Warsaw Pact, a military alliance of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual
Assistance of eight former Soviet nations, was dissolved, the future of NATO
became incertain. At that time a new definition of its role was needed. It was
considered that it could follow a new path as a peace enforcing and keeping
organization. It could alleviate suffering people in former Yugoslavia or it
could help in the founding of peace in the troubled area of Nagorno-Karabakh. A
cooperative form with Russia was also considered. But shortly after, Russia
withdrew and preferred to be the only actor in the area of the former Soviet
Union, because it did not want NATO involvement in the former Soviet Union.[6]
NATO and Ukraine
In Ukraine there was the dilemma of ‘Europe or
Russia’. A dilemma that is erroneous as geographically Ukraine is a European
country and on the other hand for centuries Europe has become the equivalent of
civilization. Ukraine also needs Europe for financial backing and trading if it
wants to improve economically.[7] Ukraine’s viewpoint with regard to NATO went
through various stages the past two decades. In the beginning, when George H.W.
Bush condemned the emerging nationalism during the perestroika period, Ukraine retraced
its steps and did not reduce its nuclear stockpile. Since the West was trying
to assimilate the new situation, Ukraine out of necessity turned towards
Russia. Finally in February 1995 Ukraine entered the NATO’s Partnership for
Peace. It held the position that by participating in this Partnership as well
as in other Councils it would work out its identity as a sovereign European
power and as Western nation.[8]
Throughout the 20th
century Ukrainian political culture was shaped round a policy of survival due
to its colonial exploitation by superpowers [Russia, Germany, the Entente
(especially France), etc. In the post-Soviet period under Kravchuk as well as
under Kuchma the Ukrainians, especially when their western supporters asked
from them to reform their state, give political freedoms and fight the
corrupted country they preferred to cooperate with Russia and in 1998 they even
signed a ten-year program of economic and military cooperation and collaboration.
In many cases Ukraine shows that vacillates between molding itself according to
Western standards and to its Russian/Soviet past. In the recent years under
Yanukovych the Ukraine believes that its cooperation with NATO is satisfactory
and so the admittance to the alliance was not an immediate or pressing action.
In the same time he reasserted the widening of a strategic partnership with
Russia.[9]
What is Russia’s reaction to the
NATO orientation of Ukraine? In 1994 Russia showed an interest to cooperate
with NATO by signing the framework document in order to become a Partnership for
Peace. In parallel another protocol was signed that yielded Russia more rights
and other allowances that were not granted to other partners of NATO. In the
same time Russia expressed its opposition to NATO’s enhancement plans. There
are speculations that Russia in its efforts to prevent Ukraine of joining NATO
prepared and concluded the Ukrainian-Russian Treaty of Friendship. Also there
were implications when in 1997 the US and Ukrainian naval held together the
exercise Sea Breeze. In the beginning, Russia which was invited, agreed to
participate. Soon this decision was changed by the Russian naval officers and
the United States became ‘invaders’ and it became obvious that Moscow would
cause troubles if Kiev decided to join NATO.[10]
NATO and Georgia
According to a referendum, that
was not binding and was held in Georgia on January 5, 2008, 77% of the voters
answered Yes to the question “Do you want Georgia to become a member of NATO?”
The results come from Georgia’s Central Election Commission. Already in 2004
Georgia’s Minister of Defense, Giorgi Baramidze, had stated that Georgia was
ready to accept in its territory the stationing of NATO armies and to host the
NATO office for the countries of the Southern Caucasus. The then German
Minister of Foreign Affairs, Joschka Fischer, ventured a guess of 2007 as a
probable date of membership. Nonetheless this membership proved to be debatable
among the European countries of the Alliance as the territorial disputes
continue in Georgia.[11]
Actually in the Bucharest Summit
Declaration in April 3, 2008 it was stated in the 23d article that: “NATO welcomes Ukraine’s and Georgia’s
Euro-Atlantic aspirations for membership in NATO. We agreed today that
these countries will become members of NATO. Both nations have made
valuable contributions to Alliance operations. We welcome the democratic
reforms in Ukraine and Georgia and look forward to free and fair parliamentary
elections in Georgia in May.” The Foreign Ministers of the state members of NATO
were through this declaration entrusted with the first evaluation of
progress at their meeting in December 2008.[12]
Unfortunately, some months prior
to this evaluation, in August 7, 2008, an encounter took place between Georgia
and Russia concerning South Ossetia at the beginning and Abkhazia afterwards,
an encounter that lasted five days until its seizure after the involvement of
the European Union. But these hostilities initiated a tragedy in which 850
people lost their lives and an estimated amount of 100.000 people were forced
to leave their homes. The Allies requested both Georgia and Russia to abide by
the international recognized territories and solicited a durable solution to
the conflict, without military action, according to the agreements they had
both signed under the Partnership for Peace. The Georgian crisis as expected
disturbed the NATO-Russia cooperation.
For the present the Georgia’s
full integration to NATO has become immobile. Of course there are praises from
the side of NATO for Georgia’s cooperation and the Allies continue to support
Georgia’s will to become a full member of the Alliance “if it still wants to
and when it meets the standards of course” according to the NATO’s commander
for Caucasus. Although according to the Secretary General NATO and Georgia are
getting even closer together and Georgia’s membership is an open topic, it was
not part of the agenda at the Chicago Summit. [13] It
becomes obvious that Georgia’s NATO membership is rather problematic because of
its territorial problems and the conflict between Tbilisi and Sukhumi. If the conflict continues it might disturb the
NATO-Russia relationships and bring them to a straight confrontation.[14]
In a report from the Institute
for Development and Social Initiatives (IDIS) “Viitorul” the idea is expressed
that there is unwillingness from the side of the political parties of Moldova to
back up cooperation between NATO and the Republic of Moldova. It is claimed
that there are two principal reasons for this. One alludes to the sense Cold
War has left to the Moldovan citizens about NATO. So the parties avoid a
discussion about Moldova and NATO fearing the political cost would have such a
discussion. The other, as it happens with other former Soviet Union Republics,
is the negative disposition of Russia with regard to the NATO enlargement.
Nonetheless the writer of the report holds that the engagement of Moldova to
the NATO’s framework of international security operation would contribute to
the promotion of Moldova’s interests worldwide.[15]
NATO and the Caucasus region
For NATO the Caucasus, Armenia,
and Azerbaijan and the Caspian Sea are of important strategic interest. They
can greatly support the logistic field for military operation to Afghanistan;
they can also participate in stability and security operations in the region as
well as during situations of crisis for humanitarian purposes. On the other
hand they themselves have unresolved territorial problems which create areas of
tensions and can trigger off clashes and provoke instability in the
region. Such an area is Nagorno-Karabakh
a spot of conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan. The role of NATO in this
area would be to promote security and stability.
Already in 1992 Armenia joined
the North Atlantic Cooperation Council. In 1994 joined the Partnership for
Peace program. During the years Armenia contributed in peace support operation,
for example, to KFOR in 2004. Armenia troops participate in Afghanistan as part
of the International Security Assistance Force. Armenia does not pursue full
membership with NATO however aspires a closer relation to the Alliance by the
deepening of political and practical cooperation. Currently emphasis is focused
on defense reform, professional military education, international and NATO
peacekeeping operations, expeditionary medical capabilities, and humanitarian
de-mining as Armenia strives to become a security provider, rather than a
security consumer, in the international community.[16]
Azerbaijan is also a logistic supporter
through air and ground corridors and is also supplier of fuel and troops. It
works hard to upgrade the security in the energy infrastructure. It also helps
NATO in its effort to perform its operation. The Caspian Sea can be thought of
as an extension of South Caucasus and can be viewed as a bridge for accession
to Central Asia. So it is important a secure coastal cooperation to be built
that would be able to respond to transnational coastal zone dangers.[17]
Russia- NATO relationships
For the time being what Allies of
NATO and especially the US want is to succeed Russian support and joint action
in European missile-defense system. Even a hesitant agreement from the side of
Moscow would be a key stone for Russia’s engagement to the Euro-Atlantic
community. This is a very delicate issue as a wrong handling of the situation
can torpedo the improvements made regarding the Russia relations with the West
until now. [18]
The crux of the matter is the mutual
mistrust between Russia and the US. Russia fears that NATO’s missile defense
system will menace its own nuclear deterrent effectiveness. In an effort to
ensure that this would not happen asks for binding assurances. Washington makes
clear that the only target of the missile defense system would be the Iranian
missiles. In any case it does not consent as it is unimaginable for US that
Russia would ever impose the features of NATO missile defense program. It
becomes clear that both parts have to develop a common ground. A first effort
has been the design of a legal framework for the exchange of technology. When
this framework is carried out could help in transparency and in the
construction of mutual confidence. [19]
The problem is that no much
progress has been made in this regard. Very often Russia threatens to take
action against the development of a missile-attack protection in Europe. In the
3d of March this year ambassador Alexander Vershbow, Deputy Secretary General
of NATO to the Moscow Missile Defense Conference, in his speech reassured
Russia that there are not hidden agendas behind this program. He insisted that
NATO wants Russia as a full partner in this Defense program. He highlighted
that this cooperation will strengthen the stability and will build confidence
and better relationship between the two parts.[20]
Conclusion:
Unarguably Black Sea region and Caucasus
have been transformed from areas of the periphery to important strategic zones.
A consequence to this is that the World Powers started having interests in
these territories and want to incorporate them into their sphere of influence. Although
NATO wants to play a role in the area, it has to take into consideration the
particular dynamics of the region as well as the international correlations.
Given that strategic attention is not so focused on Europe but is extended to
regions such as Iraq, Iran, etc, enlargement of the Alliance in not as
important as in previous years.
Russia on the other hand continues
to focus on Black Sea as its key get away to the “hot waters” of the
Mediterranean Sea. At the dawn of the 21st century Russia comes back
as a great power and wants to play a role of both the rival as well as the
partner of Europe and USA. It also appears as the all-powerful neighbor for the
former Soviet nations.
Under these circumstances NATO
enlargement although technically a feasible task it requires at the same time a
very delicate handling. NATO can act in the region as a power of political
reformation, as an influence for peace and as a provider of security. In this process NATO has to pay heed to the
areas of turbulence such as Abkhazia and South Ossetia in Georgia and the area
of Nagorno-Karabakh between Armenia and Azerbaijan. As Russia withstands to the
enlargement of NATO these animosities can fuel instability in the region. USA and the other NATO allies from their part
want to involve Russia in the European missile-defense system and to establish
a form of engagement of Russia to the Alliance. However decades of Cold War and
the distrust it generated make both parties suspicious of one another and of
hidden agendas and unwilling to grant concessions.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Hamilton, Daniel, A
Transatlantic Strategy for the Wider Black Sea?, Edited by Daniel Hamilton and Gerhard Mangott,
The Wider Black Sea Region in the 21st
Century: Strategic, Economic and Energy Perspectives NATO and Black Sea
Security. Washington, D.C: 2008
Hardley, James, Russia and the
Balkans Foreign Policy from Yeltsin to Putin. London: Hurst & Company,
2008
Larrabee F. Stephen, NATO and Black Sea Security, Edited by Daniel Hamilton and Gerhard
Mangott, The Wider Black Sea Region in
the 21st Century: Strategic, Economic and Energy Perspectives NATO and Black
Sea Security, Washington, D.C., 2008
Molchanov A., Michail, Political
Culture and National Identity in Russian-Ukrainian Relations, USA Texas:
A&M University Press College Station, 2002
Polyakov, Leonid, Ukrainian-NATO
Relations and New Prospects for Peacekeeping, London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 2003
Viacheslav, Geopolitical
Aspects of the Abkhazian Statehood: Some Results and Perspectives, Iran &
the Caucasus, BRILL, Vol. 8, No. 2 (2004).
341-349
ELECTRONIC SOURCES
Embassy of the United States Yerevan Armenia, NATO and Armenia-NATO
Relationship http://armenia.usembassy.gov/news032311.html (accessed June 1, 2012)
EURASIANET.org, Joshua Kucera, NATO: Georgia "Getting Closer" To
The Alliance, March 12, 2012 http://www.eurasianet.org/node/65108 (accessed May 17, 2012)
Moldova org. Why is Moldova
reluctant about NATO? http://politicom.moldova.org/news/why-is-moldova-reluctant-about-nato-230756-eng.html (accessed June 2, 2012)
NATO. 2012, What is NATO, Pursuing an Open Door Policy
http://www.nato.int/nato_static/assets/pdf/pdf_publications/brochure_WhatIsNATO_en.pdf (accessed May 15, 2012)
NATO http://www.nato.int/nato_static/assets/pdf/pdf_publications/20111109_backgrounder_nato_georgia-eng.pdf (accessed May 17,2012)
NATO, Alexander Vershbow, NATO’s vision for missile defense
cooperation with Russia, May 3, 2012 http://www.nato.int/cps/en/SID-8A7F4BEF-51349262/natolive/opinions_86832.htm (accessed June 1, 2012)
NYTIMES, Editorial 2012 http://www.nytimes.com, EDITORIAL NATO and Afghanistan Published: May 18, 2012 (accessed May
23, 2012)
NYTIMES, Charles A. Kupchan, Coming
in From the Cold War, June 7, 2011,
[1] NATO, 2012, What is NATO, Pursuing an Open Door Policy, 34
[2] F. Stephen Larrabee, NATO and Black Sea Security, in Daniel Hamilton
and Gerhard Mangott (eds.), The Wider
Black Sea Region in the 21st Century: Strategic, Economic and Energy
Perspectives NATO and Black Sea Security (Washington, D.C., 2008), 278
[3]
NYTIMES Editorial 2012 http://www.nytimes.com, EDITORIAL NATO and Afghanistan
Published: May 18, 2012, 23/5/2012
[4] Daniel Hamilton, A Transatlantic Strategy for the Wider Black
Sea?, in Daniel Hamilton and Gerhard Mangott
(eds.), The Wider Black Sea Region in the
21st Century: Strategic, Economic and Energy Perspectives NATO and Black Sea
Security (Washington, D.C., 2008),
321-2
[5] Hamilton 2008, 326-7
[6]James
Headley. Russia and the Balkans Foreign
Policy from Yeltsin to Putin. London: Hurst & Company, 2008. 87-8
[7] Michail A. Molchanov, Political
Culture and National Identity in Russian-Ukrainian Relations, USA: Texas
A&M University Press College Station, 2002, 225
[8]
Molchanov, 273
[10] Leonid Polyakov, Ukrainian-NATO Relations and New Prospects
for Peacekeeping, London: Royal
Institute of International Affairs, 2003. 21-6
[11] Viacheslav, Geopolitical Aspects of the Abkhazian
Statehood: Some Results and Perspectives, Iran & the Caucasus, BRILL,
Vol. 8, No. 2 (2004). 341-349
[13] NATO http://www.nato.int/nato_static/assets/pdf/pdf_publications/20111109_backgrounder_nato_georgia-eng.pdf
(accesed May 17,2012)
[14] Viacheslav , (n. 11)
[15] Moldova org. Why is Moldova reluctant about NATO? http://politicom.moldova.org/news/why-is-moldova-reluctant-about-nato-230756-eng.html (accessed June 2, 2012)
[16] Embassy of the United States Yerevan Armenia, NATO and Armenia-NATO
Relationship http://armenia.usembassy.gov/news032311.html
(accessed June 1, 2012)
[17]
EURASIANET.org, Joshua Kucera, NATO: Georgia "Getting Closer" To
The Alliance, March 12, 2012 http://www.eurasianet.org/node/65108
(accessed May 17, 2012)
[18] NYTIMES, Charles A. Kupchan, Coming in From the Cold War, June 7,
2011,
[19] NYTIMES, (n. 18)
[20] NATO, Alexander Vershbow, NATO’s vision for missile defense cooperation with Russia, May 3,
2012 http://www.nato.int/cps/en/SID-8A7F4BEF-51349262/natolive/opinions_86832.htm
(accessed June 1, 2012)
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